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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The problem addressed in this thesis will be unique, in that the issue is not to establish the
most historically accurate definition of God, or of utilitarianism, or to gain clarity regarding an
age old mystery in the field of philosophy. Rather the problem that this work will address is
unique, in that it is a problem that no one seems to be concerned with. This is not to say that no
one has ever addressed the problem, because a few men have, but those men was died over a
century ago and it seems that their pleas fell on deaf ears.
William Paley is the most purposive agent of this argument, he was a clergyman and
philosopher in the eighteenth century, best known for developing the teleological argument for
theism. In 1786 his renowned The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy was published.
This book was so respected that it was a required reading for incoming students at Cambridge
until the twentieth century. It was in this very book where Paley proposed his theory of
theological utilitarianism which expressed that God is a utilitarian.
Paley arrived at this conclusion by understanding that the world humans find themselves
in seems not only tuned for life, but for the flourishing of life. Furthermore, Paley believed that if
God truly is omnibenevolent, then He will desire the happiness of His people. Thus, given
classical theism, God must consequently be utilitarian in His dealings with mankind. So, the
problem that this thesis confronts is that this area of Paley’s work (namely, theological
utilitarianism) has been long forgotten in the philosophy of religion. To work against this
problem, this thesis will attempt to reawaken the argument for God as a utilitarian.
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This endeavor is not merely an attempt to resurrect a forgotten argument, but to answer a
legitimate question about the nature of God which has not been asked for quite some time- and
when this question has been addressed, it has been met with unsatisfactory answers. Paley’s
response to the question of “what does God do, and why does He do it?” seems, to this inquirer at
least, to be the most satisfying answer to date. Paley responds to this query by stating,
When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished
their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both…We conclude, therefore,
that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclusion being once
established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, that the method
of coming to the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire
into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness.1
Thus, Paley’s answer to the question at hand is that God does what he does for the happiness of
His creatures.
In short, the problem addressed in this work will be that there is a question in philosophy
of religion that is not being adequately answered. Given the opportunity to answer this question,
one may gain valuable insight into the nature of God and how He relates to people and the world
as a whole. It is difficult to dismiss Paley’s proposed answer to the question. It seems more than
coincidental that the man which recognized that the world is finely tuned for life also recognized
the way in which God finely tuned the world for the pleasure of mankind. He not only created
humans as sentient beings, but made so much of what humans interact with, pleasing to the
senses. This systematic design seems to reflect the idea that God creates and sustains His
creation in such a way as to maximize the happiness of sentient beings, such as humans. If this is
in fact the case (as many theistic philosophers concede), it seems to follow that the God of
theism is utilitarian when it comes to His interactions with mankind.

1

William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2002), 48.
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Statement of the Purpose
The central aim of this thesis, as stated above, is to answer the question of how one
should understand God’s relation to mankind and why God does what He does. The official
stance of the paper is clearly that God is a utilitarian in relation to His dealings with mankind,
but before this belief can be presented as justified, the paper must remove a bit of the stigma
often accompanies utilitarian ethics.
Critics of this ethical system seem to appeal to the naivety of its adherers or to the
supposedly weak rectitude that happiness/pleasure holds as the foundation for ethics. Much in
the same way that John Stuart Mill had to refute critics of his day before making a case for the
legitimacy of utilitarianism, this thesis will be required to disseminate false understandings of
exactly what it means to speak of God and to speak of utilitarian ethics. Mill says to his
contemporary critics regarding their misconceptions of utilitarianism, “Those who know
anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicuris to Bentham, who
maintained the theory of utility meant by it, not something to be contradistinguished from
pleasure, but pleasure itself.”2 Utilitarianism may not be as poorly understood as it was in Mill’s
time, but it still carries a strong stigma due to misunderstanding the term. Thus, these will be
dealt with in the paper. The terms “God” and “utilitarianism” are emphasized above because
there is apparently some confusion as to the exact meaning of them. This is precisely why they
will each be given a respectable amount of time within the paper, so that the unfair or inaccurate
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John Troyer, The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2003), 99.
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beliefs towards God and utilitarianism may be thwarted and corrected. This will be a partial
fulfillment of the purpose of this paper.
Other than simply clarifying philosophical misconceptions, this thesis will seek to fulfill
the purpose of providing clarity as to what sort of being God is. This aspect of the paper will
specifically address God’s relation with mankind and why God does what He does. This will
illuminate –potentially- for theologians and philosophers alike what the underlying purpose
behind God’s actions is and has always been. After all, if the God of theism truly is omnipotent
and sovereign, one would expect His interaction with the world to be meaningful and to
ultimately have a greater purpose than simple pragmatism.
Furthermore, a substantial goal for this thesis will be to express that utilitarianism is not
merely a matter of good or happiness, but it is a qualitative matter of good and happiness. This is
to say that goods and pleasures come in degrees and gradations, thus pleasure/happiness in the
highest goods ought to be what is sought by individuals. So if God is the highest good, as
Augustine says, then one’s happiness should be found in God, and that is what divine
utilitarianism believes that God is working toward when He interacts with mankind. Briefly
stated, the purpose for this thesis is precisely what has been stated here, to provide clarity
concerning the terms God and utilitarianism, to answer the question of why God does what he
does, and to identify what the highest good and highest pleasure in the world is.
Statement of Importance of the Problem
The debate concerning the ethical system of God, can be summed up in one central
question, “Why does God do what He does, particularly in relation with mankind?” A proper
conception of God and an accurate understanding of ethical systems is necessary for any
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individual hoping to answer this age old query. The importance of this problem can be summed
up as follows.
The field of theology is defined as the study of God. Similarly, a portion of study in the
field of philosophy of religion is the attempt to understand God’s attributes, God’s nature, and
how God relates to the world and mankind. If the question noted above were satisfactorily
answered, then both of these fields would stand to gain in precisely the ways that were just
described. As it stands however, the leading answer to questions like this one, is divine command
theory which David Baggett, Jerry Walls, and William Lane Craig are contemporary proponents
of.3 Hence the importance of this problem; the queen of the sciences and its close relative
(philosophy) will both be more exhaustive and accurate in their understanding of God once they
are able to answer not only what God is like or what He does, but why He does what he does in
relation to mankind.
Statement of Position on the Problem
As stated above, the problem addressed in this thesis is not only the resurging a longforgotten theory in the philosophy, but it is answering a crucial question for theology and
philosophy. That question is, “why does God do what He does?” Answering this question springs
forth many related questions such as, how does God relate to mankind, what is the greatest good,
how a being like God is ensured of the worship He deserves, and more. The position of this
paper will be that God does what He does (especially in relation to people) in order to promote
the maximal happiness of His creatures.

3

Their support of this theory is palpable in works such as David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls. Good God:
The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) and William Lane Craig,
Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1994).
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To claim that God acts in order to promote the maximal happiness of His creatures
means, for divine utilitarianism, that God has created the world and finely tuned it not merely to
make sentient life possible, but to make it a flourishing existence and experience of the world.
Paley articulates this point more thoroughly when he explains that,
When God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished
their misery, or he was indifferent and unconcerned about both. If [God] had wished our
misery, he might have made sure of his purpose, by forming our senses to be so many
sores and pains to us, as they are now instruments of gratification and enjoyment…If he
had been indifferent about our happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune
(as all design by this supposition is excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive
pleasure, and the supply of external objects fitted to produce it. But either of these (and
still more both of them) being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but
the first supposition, that God, when he created the human species, wished their
happiness.4
Here, Paley explains that if an omnipotent God desired to create mankind in miserable
circumstances, then he would have ensured it, and that if God was indifferent regarding human
happiness, then one would not expect such gratuitous good in the world for sentient beings.
Given these options, Paley’s work, along with this paper conclude that God must have wished
and willed the happiness of sentient beings when he created the world. Thus, divine
utilitarianism is the expression of this belief, that God is gracious in His interactions with
mankind and that His sovereignty is exercised in order to bring about the happiness of His
creatures.
Limitations
The scope of the interrelated topics connected with utilitarianism and theism is broad and
cannot adequately be covered in this thesis; nor can the depth of utilitarianism and theism be
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exhausted in one paper, so this will neither be the aim or expectation of this thesis.5 Much of the
focus will primarily gravitate toward the relationship between the God of classical theism and the
ethical system of utilitarianism.
However this thesis will not be able to cover, at least in any depth, issues such as whether
God is obligated to create the best possible world, the problem of evil, or theological issues of a
soteriological nature. The latter of these omissions will include the sovereignty of God. This is
largely a theological issue and is far too deep a subject to be included in what this paper hopes to
accomplish.
The omission of these issues is for the sake of the work and the reader alike. The length
of the paper will not allow for such a thorough treatment of these issues; rather this thesis will act
more simply as an argument for divine utilitarianism. This is not because these issues are not
important; rather the reason they cannot be included in this paper is because they are such
significant theological and philosophical concepts. Although they are important topics, they are
peripheral to the central aim of this particular work, therefore they will be excluded from this
thesis. In short, the aim of the paper is not to provide exhaustive information of all of these areas,
but to provide a case for divine utilitarianism as a plausible theory in the philosophy of religion.
Development of Thesis
The introduction of the thesis will serve as an explanation of what will be explored
throughout each section of the paper. This will include elucidations in regards to what terms

5
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unfortunately.
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must be defined before a thorough discussion of divine utilitarianism can begin; the overall
argument of the paper will also be briefly expressed here.
The terms which necessitate clarification before much progress is made in respect to the
argument for divine utilitarianism itself, are God and utilitarianism. This may seem pandering,
but if the definitions or views of these terms are not agreed upon beforehand, then the argument
for divine utilitarianism might as well be written in an indiscernible foreign language. When the
task of defining or explaining the nature of God is taken up, the views of Anselm and Thomas
Aquinas will be appealed to. This will provide a classical theistic foundation for divine
utilitarianism to work on. Similarly, when utilitarianism is defined, the ideas of Jeremy Bentham
and John Stuart Mill will be in focus; this will ensure that classical utilitarianism is in view.
The argument for divine utilitarianism will somewhat resemble the arguments of John
Gay and William Paley, both of which advocated for theological utilitarianism in the eighteenth
century. The argument presented in this work will essentially follow this outline, P1)
Relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience. P2) God
desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible. P3) Utilitarians desire
the greatest good/happiness for as many human beings as possible. C) Therefore God is a
utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as possible. Following
this argument, the summary and conclusion of the thesis will be provided.
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CHAPTER TWO: WHAT IS MEANT BY “DIVINE UTILITARIANISM”
Introduction
From paupers to presidents, one’s beliefs concerning God and ethics have a profound
effect on one’s life. There are few subjects, if any at all, that contribute to a person’s core beliefs
and overall character as substantially as these do. In an effort to more thoroughly and accurately
understand both the nature of God and the approach one ought to take in regards to ethics, the
(seemingly, largely ignored) subject of the ethics of God must be explored. A properly executed
and narrow study of this topic will provide philosophers of religion with a greater understanding
of the nature of God; likewise, it will grant theistic ethicists a stronger framework and foundation
on which to build an exhaustive theory of ethics. Finally, this study concerning God and ethics
(more specifically, God’s ethics) will answer a question in philosophy of religion which appears
to be –at least in recent years— neglected. Although the question in view, why God does what
He does in relation to man, has been “flirted” with by the Divine Command Theory; it appears
however, that this theory inadvertently avoids this particular inquiry.
In order to contribute to the fields of philosophy of religion and ethics in the way and
capacity aforementioned, a process consisting of specific steps will be appealed to. First, terms
that will play a pivotal role in this thesis must be defined. These terms will be God and
utilitarianism. These ideas need clarification before the argument of divine utilitarianism can be
developed. It is quite possible that there are many different conceptions regarding what is meant
by “God” or “utilitarianism”, so this section will narrow and clarify these conceptions by
focusing in on the classical idea of theism which was held by Anselm and Thomas Aquinas and
the classical understanding of utilitarianism as was taught by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
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Mill. Once these terms have been adequately defined for the purpose at hand, the argument for
divine utilitarianism may be presented.
Under the framework of classical theism, God is not only the Creator and Sustainer of all
things, but is also omnibenevolent, loves His creation, and possesses all other great-making
attributes as well; and in classical utilitarianism, it is believed that goods and pleasures come in
degrees. If it is in fact the case that God possesses all great-making attributes and that goods and
pleasures vary in degrees, then God is the greatest good and pleasure. However, it is not enough
for God to be the greatest intrinsic good or the greatest utility- that does not make Him utilitarian
necessarily; in order for God to be utilitarian, He must desire the greatest good/pleasure possible
for the greatest number of people possible, and that is precisely what the argument for divine
utilitarianism strives to convey. As the greatest possible being (a being which is omnibenevolent
and loves His creation), God will desire the greatest pleasure or good possible for the greatest
amount of people possible. It is the very nature of God to be utilitarian- it follows from His
goodness. This claim may be contested as over-reaching on the grounds that it is unknown
whether God desires the greatest good for the greatest number, but this work will contend that
based upon God’s goodness and personal nature it can be deduced that He does desire such ends.
Beyond this, an objector to Divine Utilitarianism may claim that God is not the Good, but it is
evident through the lens of classical theism that God has consistently been identified as such by
prominent theistic thinkers.
Finally, once the necessary terms have been defined and the argument for the theory of
divine utilitarianism has been made, the need for the theory will be reinforced. Arguably the
most purposive theory that attempts to explain the ethics of God is the Divine Command Theory.
The final chapter of this work will contrast these two theories (Divine Utilitarianism and Divine
12

Command Theory) and highlight what the former is able to explain that the latter is incapable of
explaining. The three main ideas that Divine Utilitarianism is able to explain, which Divine
Command Theory is deficient in responding to will include, why God does what He does, how
God’s necessity to be worshipped is ultimately satisfied, and theodicies. In a very straightforward way, Divine Utilitarianism provides an adequate explanation for why God does what He
does (to promote the greatest good for the greatest number), whereas Divine Command Theory
merely expresses what God does. In terms of explaining God’s necessity to be worshipped,
Divine Utilitarianism ensures the worship of God by free agents by appealing to God’s
sovereignty in ensuring this outcome; however Divine Command Theory does not guarantee the
satisfaction of this divine necessity. Finally, concerning theodicies, Divine Utilitarianism is
capable of accepting these justifications for the acts of God as the utilitarian constructs that they
are—wherein God allows the ends to justify the means, but Divine Command Theory does not
allow for this Machiavellian principle quite as easily. Following the defining of necessary terms,
the argument for Divine Utilitarianism, and this contrast of divine utilitarianism and Divine
Command Theory, not only will Divine Utilitarianism be more accessible and understood, but it
will be seen as a purposive and persuasive theory in regards to the ethics of God.
A Definition of God
Defining a term typically includes elucidating the terms’ origin and expounding upon the
usefulness of the term in question. However, the aim here is not to create a new definition of
God; rather it is to explore two similar and widely accepted definitions of God that have been
established and respected for centuries. The definition of God which Anselm proposed in his
pivotal works Monologion and Proslogion (around 1059-1078 A.D.) has been the standard by
which most theists have understood the concept of God ever since. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas’
13

theological stances have been somewhat of a textbook for Catholics since the fourteenth century.
This being said, the definition of God that Anselm came to nearly one thousand years ago (and
that Thomas carried throughout medieval times) is still the definition that most people have in
view when they use the term “God”.6 Simply stated, Anselm’s beliefs in this regard are not only
purposive, but are quite attractive as well, as his influence throughout time is evidence of.
However, in regards to Divine Utilitarianism, this definition of God accomplishes more
than simply establishing what the nature of God is like; rather this classical view of God also
enables one to arrive at the Augustinian notion that God is the Good. This is to say that
adherence to classical theism leads one not only to the belief that God is the greatest possible
being; the classical theist will consequently believe that God is the Good. By this terminology
(i.e. the Good) Augustine means to communicate that God is the greatest good in existence and
that relationship with Him is the greatest good/happiness that a human being can experience.
This point will be discussed more thoroughly in later chapters, but it is worth noting here that the
classic theistic definition of God will lay the foundation for seeing God as the Good—and will
consequently lead to the theory of Divine Utilitarianism.
Anselm’s God
Anselm’s God is commonly referred to as the perfect being, the greatest conceivable
being, and/or the greatest possible being.7 Anselm arrives at this conclusion (partially) by means

6

This may seem like a bit of a generalization, so here is some clarification on this claim. When theists are
mentioned here, polytheists are not necessarily in view or consideration; rather monotheists are the focus. Whether a
person is Muslim, Jewish, or Christian, the individual would espouse the idea that their God is in accordance with
the definition that Anselm sets forth in the aforementioned texts. Given this, it is accurate to state here that a
majority of theists in general would accept Anselm’s definition, but for clarity’s sake, monotheists are those (the
majority) which do in fact accept this idea/definition.
7
Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (ed.), Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 87.
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of the Platonic idea that there is a form or a definitive standard by which all things are
measured.8 When one would claim that “x is good” or “x is a sheep”, Plato and Anselm would
say that one would never claim these things to be the case unless one had a working
understanding or idea of goodness and sheepness. In the same way, Anselm says, “for example,
some things that are said, relative to each other, to be, either equally, or more, or less just. They
cannot be understood to be just except through justice”.9 Due to Anselm’s deeply rooted Platonic
conviction that all things (objects, attributes, virtues, etc.) have a form which is definitive of what
is experienced of them in this life, Anselm most likely –and very easily— saw the next logical
step in this idea as identifying God as the form for all great-making attributes. As a Christian,
Anselm wondered one day in meditation and prayer why it is that “The fool says in his heart,
there is no God” (Psalm 14:1). The chief mystery to Anselm was why it is so foolish to believe
that there is no God, after all, this stance seems to be justifiable prima facie. Through his
meditation, prayer, and writing Anselm came to the revelation of why it is so foolish for one to
say to oneself that there is no God—it is impossible even to think this.
The impossibility of God’s non-existence is easily conceded once Anselm’s
understanding of the nature of God is expressed. As was mentioned earlier, Anselm defines God
as a being, “that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.”10 He expounds upon this phrase
by clarifying his Platonic view of God in the Monologion,
there is something supremely good (because all good things are good through some one
thing, namely that which is good through itself). But in the same way we arrive at the
necessary conclusion that there is something supremely great, since whatsoever is great is
great through some one thing, namely that which is great through itself…And since only
8
The idea of the forms is not explicitly stated in Plato’s works, rather it is more of an underlying theme. It
can be found especially in Phaedo and the Republic.
9
Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (ed.), Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1998), 12.
10
Ibid. 87.

15

that which is supremely good can be supremely great, it is necessary that there is
something that is best and greatest—i.e. of everything that exists, the supreme.11
This exert from Anselm’s work displays his belief in God as a necessary being. Very similarly to
C. S. Lewis, Anselm postulates that mankind would have no referent or recognition of goodness,
greatness, justice, etc. unless there were a standard by which these characteristics were measured
by—both of these thinkers believe that standard to be God.12 Furthermore, both Anselm and
Lewis convey that because attributes such as these are in fact recognizable, there must be some
agent, some being, some thing which not only sets the standard for great-making attributes but is
the greatest being in all of existence. One recognizes that there are gradations of great-making
attributes, so there must be in existence one being which is the greatest of all; this being is the
standard that attributes of this nature are measured, this being (according to Anselm and Lewis)
is God.
Anselm has more to say about the nature of God than that He is the standard of goodness
and greatness; he also commits to the belief that it is impossible for one to contend that God does
not exist, and this is precisely what makes the fool’s phrase “there is no God” foolish. If it is the
case that God necessarily exists, and His nature is such that He is the standard of goodness, then
God necessarily is (by His nature) the standard of goodness by which all other goods are
measured. This all begins with Anselm’s belief that God is a necessary being; a being which
cannot, not exist. In his Proslogion Anselm essentially states that God is the being that-thanwhich-nothing-greater-can-be-thought, so God does exist, at the very least, in the mind.
However, it is greater for a being to exist in reality than merely in the mind. Making this
distinction, Anselm states that God necessarily exists in reality if He exists in the mind. Further
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Ibid. 13.
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2001), 38.
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still, Anselm claims “that God cannot be thought not to exist”.13 This is a two-fold answer for
Anselm; it explains that if God exists in the mind, God must exist in reality, and that if God is the
greatest conceivable and greatest possible being, then it is impossible for Him not to exist.
However, there are arguments against both of these descriptions of God, so they must be taken
into consideration.
As for the necessity of God’s existence in reality following from His existence in the
mind, there is some debate in the philosophy of language as to whether the term ‘exists’ has
predication or not.14 That is, it is arguable to claim that stating “God exists” does not convey any
information about God, therefore it is a useless statement and does not add anything to God’s
nature or one’s understanding of God’s nature. It has also been argued that “every deduction
from a definition is only valid hypothetically, on the assumption that the subject of the definition
is real. A definition, however, cannot be used to establish this assumption.”15 Those who hold to
this view would express that claiming “that lamp exists”, adds nothing to one’s understanding of
the lamp since it was clearly in existence and understood to exist previous to the statement being
made. In response to this criticism, the classical theist would commit that to express the
existence of something (i.e. “x exists”) does convey information about the subject.
For instance, upon hearing or reading the popular story of Tom Sawyer, it may come as a
surprise to hear that amid all of Tom’s attributes, there is also existence. This revelation would

13

Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (ed.), Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 88.
14
Fred Adams and Gary Fuller, “Empty Names and Pragmatic Implicatures,” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 37.3 (2007), http://www.jstor.org/stable/40232330?pqorigsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Anthony Everett, “Against Fictional Realism,” The Journal of Philosophy 102.12 (2005): 624–649,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3655676?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
15
F. Ueberweg, Grundiss der Geschichte der Philosophie vol. II, rev. by B. Geyer (Berlin, 1928), 199. As
found in John Hick, and Arthur Chute McGill, The Many-faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological
Argument for the Existence of God, (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 35.

17

certainly convey something new to a reader. Likewise, if one were told of an animal which has a
duck bill, webbed feet, is venomous, and has fur; it would be reasonable to assume the animal
described is fictitious. To the contrary, the platypus is quite real. So, to convey that “x exists”
does in fact express something new about a subject which was not previously known; and for a
being to exist is better than for it not to exist; this being understood, it is correct for Anselm to
claim that ‘existence’ is a necessary attribute for the greatest conceivable being to have.
Furthermore, the necessary existence of Anselm’s God guarantees the existence of God as the
standard of goodness.
Another objection to Anselm’s claim that it is impossible for God not to exist simply
claims that it is possible for God not to exist. This objection fundamentally ignores the entire
nature of God in Anselm’s ontological argument though. After all, Anselm’s argument is called
the ontological argument; by definition Anselm’s argument rises and falls upon the nature of
God. As was stated previously, Anselm believed God to be a being “something-than-whichnothing-greater-can-be-thought”16 This is the point in Anselm’s argument where one must make
a crucial decision, because this is when a dilemma is presented to the skeptic. On one hand, the
skeptic (or fool) can grant that Anselm’s God is possible, but “in granting that Anselm’s God as
a possible thing, we are in fact granting that Anselm’s God actually exists.”17 On the other hand,
Anselm claims that to imagine God as a non-existing being is either to completely misunderstand
what is meant by the greatest conceivable being or is intellectually dishonest. He articulates this
dilemma in the beginning of the Proslogion when he says,
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Even the fool, then, is forced to agree that something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-bethought exists in the mind, since he understands this when he hears it, and whatever is
understood is in the mind. And surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind it can be thought to exist
in reality also, which is greater. If then that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought
exists in the mind alone, this same that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought is thatthan-which-a-greater-can-be-thought. But this is obviously impossible. Therefore there is
absolutely no doubt that something-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought exists both
in the mind and in reality.18
As Anselm plainly expresses here, it is easy for one to understand the concept of God in one’s
mind, but to limit God merely to existence in the mind is by definition a logical impossibility
since He is the greatest conceivable being. This makes Anselm’s understanding of the nature of
God clear; “no one, indeed, understanding what God is can think that God does not exist…for
God is that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought.”19 This understanding of God as the
greatest conceivable being paved the way for the great medieval thinker Thomas Aquinas who
would come over a century after the death of Anselm and carry a significantly similar view of
God and God’s nature into modern times.
Thomas’ God
Whereas Anselm’s understanding and definition of God can be adequately summarized
as the greatest conceivable being and he clarifies that this being is the greatest possible being,
Thomas holds that God is –simply put— the greatest possible being.20 The major difference in
these two men’s views of God (at least semantically) is that the former contends that God is the
greatest being that the human mind can think about, and the latter, that God is the absolute
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greatest being that is capable of existing. Thomas commonly explains his view of God by
conveying that God has no potentiality whatsoever, rather God is pure actuality.21
There are great nuances within and implications from this view of God, but the crucial
concept to understand regarding this subject in Thomas’ theology is that Thomas believed God to
be the absolute perfect being with no potential to be greater. In relation with this concept of God,
Thomas explains that because evil is the absence of good, and since God is the form of good, all
evil is merely a privation of His nature. He expresses this as follows, “As the term good signifies
‘perfect being,’ so the term evil signifies nothing else than ‘privation of perfect being.’”22 This
view of God also requires Thomas to ascribe to beliefs such as God not having a body, God not
having any accidental properties, and God being a “simple” being, meaning that His essential
properties are indiscernible from one another.23
Thomas clarifies his beliefs concerning God not having a body and being a simple being
when he argues, “If when we say ‘God is good’, nothing is signified other than that God is the
cause of goodness in things, in the same way it should be possible to say that God is a body
because he is the cause of bodies. Similarly, in saying that God is a body, one separates that he is
only a being in potentiality, as prime matter is.”24 In other words, matter is spatially and
temporally finite as oppose to limitless; this being the nature of corporeal entities, it is an
impossibility for God to be both pure actuality and have a body. In this same sense, Thomas
argues that if God were not a simple being, then one’s ability to distinguish between God’s
attributes would be an observation of (for instance) God’s justice ending at one point and His
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grace beginning at another.25 This is a contradiction within the being of God according to
Thomas. In order for God to be the greatest possible being, God must be simple—which makes
Him indivisible.
Another characteristic of Thomas’ view of God is that He has no accidental properties.
The obvious antithesis to this proposal is to claim that God has only essential properties. Thomas
believes that God cannot have accidental properties, because yet again this would mean that
there were some type or capacity of potentiality in God.26 However, since God is pure actuality,
He has no accidental properties, and the properties that He does have are essential and even
necessary for God to have. The necessity of these attributes is not due to some type of a
dependence that God has on them; rather they are essential to His nature. Without any one of His
attributes God would be a different being than He is. It is in this sense that all of God’s attributes
are necessary and none of which can be accidental.
The glaring similarities between Anselm and Thomas’ conceptions of God were carried
into modern philosophy and are chronicled by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz when he opens his
Discourse on Metaphysics by saying, “The most widely accepted and meaningful notion that we
have of God is expressed well enough in these words, that God is an absolutely perfect being…it
is appropriate to remark that there are several entirely different perfections in nature, that God
possesses all of them together, and that each of them belongs to him in the highest degree.”27
This is the foundation that Divine Utilitarianism is built upon. This definition of God is that
which has been regarded and held by many throughout the centuries following Anselm and

25
Thomas, Aquinas's Shorter Summa: St. Thomas Aquinas's Own Concise Version of His Summa
Theologica (Manchester: Sophia Institute, 2002), 14-5.
26
Ibid. 15.
27
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, 1686, Discourse on Metaphysics, English translation by R. Ariew and D.
Garber in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing: 1989), Section 1.

21

Thomas. In fact, it is renowned enough that when discussing the “idea of God” in Philosophy of
Religion, William Rowe includes both Anselm’s and Thomas’ views as the framework for what
he understands theists meaning by “God”.28 The significance of the idea that God is the greatest
conceivable being as well as the greatest possible being is indispensable for the theory of Divine
Utilitarianism, and this is because of what follows from this understanding of God. For those
who ascribe to the Anselmian and/or Thomistic understanding of God’s nature, God ultimately
becomes synonymous or identical with the greatest good in existence.
A Definition of Utility
The aim of Divine Utilitarianism (clearly) is to establish that God does all things for the
sake of “the greatest good for the greatest number”, but in order to determine the validity of this
conclusion one must have a correct understanding of what the greatest good is and what is meant
by utility. In order to achieve this, gradations of good and the identity of the “greatest good” will
be explored according to Augustine and this will be corroborated by other theistic thinkers.
Following this, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill’s belief in pleasure as utility and his
proposition that some pleasures are higher than others will be explicated. Once these issues are
considered and a thorough understanding of God and of utility has been established, the
supposed and likely utility of God may be elucidated upon.29
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Augustine and the Good
Throughout his writings Augustine discerns different gradations of goodness and
recognizes God as the pinnacle of goodness. At the beginning of his Confessions Augustine
describes and praises God by simply identifying some of His attributes, “Most high, most
excellent, most potent, most omnipotent; most merciful and most just; most secret and most truly
present; most beautiful and most strong.”30 By claiming that something or someone is the
“most…” one is assuming that some things are lower and some are higher qualitatively, and in
this case Augustine is acknowledging God as the being which displays and exemplifies the
aforementioned attributes maximally. This is no odd phenomenon in Augustine’s work either;
rather it is a theme throughout his writings. In his Soliloquia he records a philosopher’s prayer, in
that prayer he refers to God repetitiously as a maximal degree or standard of great-making
attributes. For instance, “O God the Truth…O God the Wisdom…O God the True and Highest
Life…O God the Blessed Happiness…O God the Good and Beautiful in whom and by whom
and through whom all things that are good and beautiful are good and beautiful.”31 A significant
distinction needs to be made here between the difference in ascribing an attribute to something
and identifying something as the example or standard of an attribute. To claim that a judge’s
sentencing was just is quite different from saying that a judge’s sentencing is now the standard of
justice throughout the land. Here, Augustine has not said that God is good; rather he has said that
God is the Good. In other words, when degrees of goodness are being discussed by Bentham,
Mill, and other utilitarians, Augustine would claim that God is the standard by which they are
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comparing and understanding “good” by. God is not only good, God is the Good, and further
still, God is the distributor and sustainer of all good things according to Augustine.
Augustine (by far) is not alone when he identifies God as the distributor and sustainer of
good, or more specifically as the Good. Thomas explained in his Summa Contra Gentiles,
“Nothing…will be called good except in so far as it has a certain likeness of the divine
goodness.”32 Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump go further in explaining why –rather than
merely that— it is that that God is commonly understood as the Good, “the actualization of a
thing’s specifying potentialities is, to the extent of the actualization, that thing’s being whole,
complete, free from defect—the state all things naturally aim at; it is in this sense that the thing is
said to have goodness.”33 On this notion, if God has no potentiality and is pure actuality as
Thomas contends, then God is rightly identified as the Good because He exemplifies “goodness”
to its maximal actuality. Therefore, under the construct of classical theism, God is the Good.
This truth is echoed passionately by David Baggett and Jerry L. Walls as well,
In some important sense we wish to argue that God just is the ultimate Good. This view,
too, has a venerable history within Christianity. Thomists, Anselmians, theistic Platonists,
and theistic activists, including such contemporary analytic philosophers as Alvin
Plantinga and Robert Adams, all concur that on a Christian understanding of reality, God
and the ultimate Good are ontologically inseparable.34
This certainly establishes that in classical theism God is the Good, but this is not enough by itself
to make a compelling case for Divine Utilitarianism. As was stated at the beginning of this
section, the aim of Divine Utilitarianism is to establish that God does all things for the sake of
“the greatest good for the greatest number.” At this point all that has been concluded is that God
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Himself is the greatest good; in order to discern whether God is concerned with utilitarianism
whatsoever, an understanding of utility must be possessed and that utility must align with God’s
nature and desire.
Bentham and Mill on Utility
The father of utilitarianism Jeremy Bentham addressed what he meant by utility in the
first chapter of his political philosophy work An Introduction to the Principles of Moral
Legislation. This chapter is opened with a section entitled “Mankind governed by pain and
pleasure.”35 Bentham believes pain and pleasure to be intrinsically bad and good respectively. By
this he means that pleasure is something that humans associate as a good thing and not bad
whatsoever, and the converse is true of pain; this is how Bentham arrives at the conclusion that
utility (specifically happiness/pleasure) is the basis of most human decisions.
In a later chapter Bentham observes that all laws either have or ought to have as their end
the augmenting of happiness in a community, which includes the minimization of “mischief”.36
Elsewhere Bentham challenges those that are averse to utilitarianism to adjudicate by which
other criterion they would judge or make decisions by if not happiness. In this thought
experiment the objector to utilitarianism is told, “if there be, let him examine and satisfy himself
whether the principle he thinks he has found is really any separate intelligible principle; or
whether it be not a mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at bottom expresses neither
more nor less than the mere averment of his own unfounded sentiments; that is, what in another
person he might be apt to call caprice?”37 This interaction with a skeptic of utilitarianism reveals

35

Jeremy Bentham, 1789, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1907), 8.
36
Ibid. 26.
37
Ibid. 11.

25

that Bentham had little regard for alternative principles which guide decision-making faculties.
In fact, it seems as if Bentham sees these supposed alternatives as naïve and fabricated attempts
aimed at disassociating with the term “utility” rather than aiming at truth. However, Bentham
chose the “greatest happiness principle” to be that by which he determined whether actions,
decisions, legislations, and the like are in line with the Good or not—because pleasure/happiness
is an intrinsically good thing which is (by God’s design, for theists) interwoven into every
decision as a determining factor. 38 It may also be noted here that Bentham’s “greatest happiness
principle” is reminiscent of Augustine’s understanding of the gradations of good.
In the same way that goodness has different degrees, there are higher and lower degrees
of happiness as well, and this is the criterion by which utilitarians make their decisions. As
Bentham argues in favor for, utilitarians adjudicate based on what they believe will bring about
the greatest good (happiness) for the greatest number. Bentham’s prize student and prodigy John
Stuart Mill substantially expounded upon Bentham’s utilitarian ethic throughout his career and
created a more exhaustive understanding of this ethical theory. He corroborates Bentham’s
association of pleasure with utility vehemently when he tells critics of utilitarianism,
Those who know anything about the matter are aware that every writer, from Epicurus to
Bentham, who maintained the theory of utility meant by it, not something
contradistinguished from pleasure, but pleasure itself, together with exemption from pain;
and instead of opposing the useful to the agreeable or the ornamental, have always
declared that the useful means these among other things.39
Directly following his approbation of utility and pleasure being two sides of the same coin, Mill
continues his agreement with Bentham’s utilitarianism. “The creed which accepts as the
foundation of morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in
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proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of
happiness.”40 Thus, under a utilitarian ethical construct, an action is good (or in line with the
Good, one could say) insofar as it promotes happiness. This explication of utilitarian ethics
connotes that one’s decisions can promote happiness in varying capacities; the capacity of
happiness which is promoted is dependent on the object or activity which one is involved with
and its capability to promote happiness.
Bentham acknowledges that there is an obvious distinction in capacities of
goodness/happiness in his famous (or infamous) article “Greatest Happiness of the Greatest
Number”.41 He believed as Mill did, that one ought to strive to promote maximal happiness in
one’s decisions. Different from Mill however, Bentham had a list of criteria which allowed one
to quantify and measure the degree to which some thing or action promoted happiness. Some of
the criteria which happiness ought to be measured by includes: its intensity, its duration, its
purity, and its extent.42 The former two circumstances are rather self-explanatory; however the
latter two have a specific meaning for Bentham. By the purity of the happiness produced,
Bentham means that the degree to which happiness was produced by an action far outweighs the
degree to which pain was produced. The more happiness and less pain that an action produces,
increases the quality of purity that the act is measured by. The extent of the happiness produced
has more to do with the quantity of people involved in and affected by the act. In this instance
Bentham is “tak[ing] an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be
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concerned.”43 Considering these variables certainly gives one a much more formidable
opportunity to discern how to promote the “greatest good” as a utilitarian, but the question of
whether or not God is concerned with these variables or if God promotes the greatest good for
the greatest number has yet to be addressed.
Divine Utilitarianism in the Past
In order to adjudicate whether or not God acts intentionally in order to bring about the
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, it must first be determined whether or not
God acts with a particular telos desired or with reason(s) for acting the way that he does. Leibniz
remarks regarding this matter that in all cases God must have an ends for which He acts. He
ultimately provides one reason for reaching this conclusion. Before he posits his reasoning for
believing that God has a purpose for all that He does, Leibniz says that by responding to this
criticism he is “overlooking the fact that this seems impossible.”44 To Leibniz, this is an
absurdity for any being, especially an omniscient one. Barring this reservation, Leibniz delivers
his reason for believing that God cannot perform any action without reason for doing so, “I say
that this action of God is at the very least not praiseworthy; for all praise must be based on some
reason, and by hypothesis there is none here. Instead I hold that God does nothing for which he
does not deserve to be glorified.”45 It is God’s perfection and holiness as the greatest possible
being which ensures that He not only have reason for His actions, but that those reasons (ends)
be the greatest purposes possible, His glory through the praise of His creatures.
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Furthermore, another explanation may be provided here which petitions that God is a
better being if He does have a purpose (and a consistent purpose) for His actions rather than the
contrary. For if there is no purpose for God’s actions, then He is capricious and His creatures are
not necessarily ensured of His will for their good. However, this would make God less than the
greatest possible being, and this has been shown to be some being other than God.
Understanding that God does all things with a purpose, it must now be determined by the
adherents of Divine Utilitarianism what God’s underlying purpose is for His actions in relation to
mankind.
The foundational question that must be asked when adjudicating if God is a utilitarian is
whether or not God is concerned with human happiness whatsoever. If He is, then one must
inquire if God orchestrates all things to the ends of human happiness; if He is not concerned with
human happiness, then one need not look further into the matter because God by definition
would not be utilitarian without concern of human happiness. William Paley, an eighteenth
century English clergyman, author, and philosopher published his Moral and Political
Philosophy in 1785 after being urged to by fellow faculty at Cambridge. Following its
publication, Moral and Political Philosophy was required reading for admission into Cambridge
until the twentieth century. While Paley is renowned for his contributions in philosophy of
religion by way of his discovery of the teleological argument for the existence of God; his most
famous publication Moral and Political Philosophy has been largely forgotten by most
philosophers. It is in this work that Paley reveals his beliefs and reasons regarding God’s concern
for human happiness.
Ultimately Paley appeals to his teleological argument for God’s existence when
answering the question of God’s aim or ends for His actions. He explains quite plainly, “When
29

God created the human species, either he wished their happiness, or he wished their misery, or he
was indifferent and unconcerned about both.”46 Paley goes on to give a fair amount of detail
explaining how human beings would experience each of these possible realities. For instance, “If
he had wished our misery, he might have made sure of his purpose…He might have made, for
example, everything we tasted, bitter; everything we saw, loathsome; everything we touched, a
sting; every smell a stench; and every sound a discord.”47 God, an omnipotent and omniscient
being is well within His capabilities to devise a world suited for mankind’s misery, and this
could have been achieved in many more –and much more offensive— ways than those
mentioned. Fortunately, this is not the world that mankind finds itself in, so God must either be
indifferent concerning man’s happiness or He is in fact concerned with man’s happiness and acts
in an effort to bring about this ends.
The probability of God being indifferent or unconcerned with mankind’s happiness
seems unlikely prima facie. Ultimately, if this were the case one would expect the world to be
insipid, largely void of pleasure and pain, but this is not the state of affairs that mankind
experiences. Nearly all (if not all) actions have pleasurable or painful consequences. Furthermore
reminiscent of his teleological argument; Paley argues that “if he had been indifferent about our
happiness or misery, we must impute to our good fortune (as all design by this supposition is
excluded) both the capacity of our senses to receive pleasure, and the supply of external objects
fitted to produce it. But either of these (and still more both of them) [are] too much to be
attributed to accident.”48 Paley acknowledges as well that the world human beings find
themselves in is not bland, rather it is fitted for mankind’s enjoyment and flourishing, but he
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goes a step further to say that if God was not the agent that fitted the world for mankind’s
enjoyment, then accident is to credit for this outstanding mishap. However, as Paley explains in
his teleological argument, and as is explained in all theistic arguments for design, the probability
of accident being the cause of a functioning universe is infinitesimal – much less a functioning
universe that is so well suited for human pleasure.49 It is these two weaknesses in the divine
indifference hypothesis which cause Paley to claim, “Nothing remains but the first supposition,
that God, when he created the human species, wished their happiness; and made for them the
provision which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose.”50
It is at this point in Paley’s Moral and Political Philosophy that Paley has eliminated the
propositions which claim that God either had nefarious or indifferent aims in creating mankind.
These eliminations left only the possibility of God desiring and aiming at mankind’s happiness in
His act of creation. For Paley, as the father of the teleological argument it is of no surprise that
he appeals to its usefulness in his effort to establish that God is not only Creator and Sustainer,
but He also acts in a utilitarian way in relation with mankind. It is by this observation of the
design of the universe that Paley discredited opposing views, and it is by this observation that he
establishes the strength of Divine Utilitarianism,
The world abounds with contrivances: and all the contrivances which we are acquainted
with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil, no doubt, exists; but is never, that we can
perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching
now and then, is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps inseparable from it: or even, if you
will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a
distinction which well deserves to be attended to.51
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In short, Paley is exposing the reality that for millennia theists have espoused Augustine’s
doctrine that evil is merely a privation of good, but have taken for granted the reciprocal
implication of this statement. Paley is uncovering a powerful yet obvious truth that God is not
only good, He is the Good, and any evil in the world is a deviation from or privation of His
design. Therefore it follows that an ends (telos, purpose, etc.) which God desires of His actions is
the common good of mankind.
This brings Paley to his final assertion on the matter of God’s will. Recall that the entire
purpose of adjudicating whether God created with the purpose of human happiness, misery, or
neither was to discern which of these aligns with God’s will. With this in view, Paley says,
We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And
this conclusion being once established, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon
it, namely, ‘that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the
light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the
general happiness.’52
Ultimately, Paley arrives at Divine Utilitarianism by observing the world and its regularities, and
recognizing that God created intentionally with mankind’s happiness and flourishing in mind.
Paley rightfully determines that God would have been well within His capabilities to create a
world much less hospitable for mankind, but that is not the state of affairs that the human species
finds itself in. Rather, the world is created –seemingly— for the ends of human happiness and
thriving. Leibniz records a similar understanding of a connection between God’s nature and
human happiness and articulates this discovery as follows, “God, possessing infinite wisdom,
acts in the most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking, and that,
with respect to ourselves, we can say that the more enlightened and informed we are about God’s
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works, the more we will be disposed to find them excellent and in complete conformity with
what we might have desired.”53 It is from this shared observation that Paley determines that God
wills for the common good of mankind and that it follows that God is a utilitarian in His actions
relating to mankind.
Although an unpopular stance throughout history, Divine Utilitarianism was held by
another eighteenth century English philosopher as well.54 John Gay ascribed to Divine
Utilitarianism in his work A Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle and Immediate
Criterion of Virtue.55 Although Gay arrives at Divine Utilitarianism by means of a different
argument, he expresses the same conclusion and attempts to promulgate the same understanding
of God and ethics that Paley does in his treatment of the issue. Gay argues, “Now it is evident
from the nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity, and from his
goodness manifested in his works, that he could have no other design in creating mankind than
their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness; therefore the means of their happiness.”56
Whereas Paley appealed to God’s creation as evidence for his being a utilitarian; Gay appeals to
God’s nature and His continued interaction with creation as evidence of Divine Utilitarianism.
God was happy throughout eternity past (since God is pure actuality, and happiness/pleasure is a
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great-making attribute, one may justifiably assume this), therefore one is warranted in assuming
that God desired happiness to be experienced by His creatures as well. This point is further
understood by observation of God’s interactions with His creation, or His “works” as Gay calls
them.
One does not observe a devastating tornado or the subjugation of a body by a cancerous
disease and remark upon it “what a miracle, thank God.” This would equate to nonsense in this
world; rather as Paley says, these instances of evil are merely privations of God’s goodness in
this world. This is why the term miracle is reserved for instances such as tornadoes redirecting
their routes to miss a home or a crop, or for cases of terminal cancers being reversed. These are
the types of situations that are coined miraculous and related with God, and these are the types of
circumstances Gay is referring to when he says, “His goodness manifested in his works”57 In
Gay’s eyes, it is God’s nature and the occasions wherein God chooses to intervene with creation
that renown His goodness and are evidence of His zeal for the happiness for mankind.
Paley and Gay’s arguments for Divine Utilitarianism appeal to widely accepted beliefs in
theism such as God creating, God being happy in and through Himself, and God performing
miracles in the world. However, these thinkers add that God created in such a way that it
promotes the common happiness of mankind, that God being Good desires mankind to
experience happiness similar to the way that He does, and that miracles are evidence of God
interfering with the world in order to bring about a greater intensity, duration, and/or extent of
human happiness. These motivations are not averse to the nature of God; rather they are aligned
with God’s nature and make good sense of many of God’s actions. In the same way that these
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arguments interact with God’s nature in order to arrive at answers for questions such as, why
does God do what He does in relation to mankind or what is God’s motivation when He acts; a
new argument for Divine Utilitarianism will appeal to God’s nature (particularly the classical
understanding of God as the Good) in an effort to answer whether God is utilitarian in His ethics
and why God does what He does.
New Divine Utilitarianism
This new argument for Divine Utilitarianism does not counteract or cancel out the
arguments on the theory’s behalf from the past, rather it approaches the topic from a different
angle so to speak and is therefore capable of answering different –yet germane— questions on
the topic. This new Divine Utilitarianism may be summarized as follows, P1) Relationship with
God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience. P2) God desires as many
human beings to have relationship with Him as possible. P3) Utilitarians desire the greatest
good/happiness for as many human beings as possible. C) Therefore God is a utilitarian because
He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as possible. Although the premises of
this argument have been available and even agreed upon for centuries they have never been
combined in order to make an argument for God as a utilitarian. Furthermore there are arguments
(such as Paley’s and Gay’s) for Divine Utilitarianism –as has been shown above— however they
do not use the same reasons that are used in new Divine Utilitarianism. Thus although neither the
premises nor the conclusion of this argument are novel, their combination and formulation as an
argument are. This is precisely what makes new Divine Utilitarianism new. These phrases have
not been argued for before, collectively. This being recognized, there must be a reason that these
phrases have not been argued for collectively. This is either because their correlation was
unrecognized, their conclusion was undesirable, or a component of or the entire argument is
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fallacious. The aim of this presentation of new Divine Utilitarianism is to put these suppositions
to rest and establish good reasons for believing that God does all things for the sake of the
greatest good for the greatest number.
Relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience.
It was claimed earlier (corroborated by Augustine and Thomas) that God is the Good. If
this is in fact the case as classical theism attests, then it is a mere tautology to claim that
relationship between God and human beings is the greatest good that humans can hope to attain.
A review of the literature concerning classical theism and God as the Good exhibits a clear link
between these claims. This idea of relationship with God as the greatest good for sentient,
rational, free beings appears to necessarily follow in classical theism for thinkers such as
Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas. Each of these men express their passionate belief that
relationship with God is the greatest good humans can experience.
Joseph Clair explains in his recent research on Augustine’s concept of the Good that,
“Augustine’s conception of ethical goodness is also interwoven with his account of happiness.
The highest good for humankind—a happy life—is achieved when one clings to the supreme
good.”58 Augustine corroborates this when he says of God, “He is the source of our happiness
and the very end of all our aspirations…We pursue Him with our love so that when we reach
Him we may rest in perfect happiness in the One who is our goal.”59 Anselm dedicates the final
four sections of his Proslogion to understanding the extent of God’s goodness and the degree to
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which relationship with Him brings joy and happiness to human beings. He begins by asking, “If
particular goods are enjoyable, consider carefully how enjoyable is that good which contains the
joyfulness of all goods; not such as we have experienced in created things, but as different from
this as the Creator differs from the creature.”60 He answers his own query in the following
section of the Proslogion by expressing that, “to the degree that each one loves some other, so he
will rejoice in the good of that other; therefore, just as each one in that perfect happiness will
love God incomparably more than himself and all others with him, so he will rejoice
immeasurably more over the happiness of God than over his own happiness and that of all the
others with him.”61 Anslem’s answer as to the quantity of joy that is experienced when in
relation to God is essentially that one’s joy is only limited by the capacity in which one loves
God. As the source of happiness and the Good, relationship with God is an incomprehensible
joy, and the closer one is to God, the more joy one will experience. Thomas corroborates this
position thoroughly and concisely in his Shorter Summa, “This ultimate end of man we call
beatitude. For a man’s happiness or beatitude consists in the vision whereby he sees God in His
essence. Of course, man is far below God in the perfection of his beatitude. For God has this
beatitude by his very nature, whereas man attains beatitude by being admitted to a share in the
divine light.”62 Again, it is consistently attested to that the telos of man is happiness and that this
is found ultimately in the God of classical theism.
All human decisions result in either greater pleasure and lesser pain, or the inverse; this
includes the relationships that human beings choose to participate in, these have the same effect
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on one’s experience of pleasure and pain. God is the greatest being in existence, He is the Good
and there is no privation of goodness in God since He is pure actuality. Furthermore, God is the
source of happiness. Therefore relationship between human beings and God results in the
greatest amount of happiness (and good) that can be experienced by human beings. John
Wesley’s corroboration of this theory is expressed in an anthology of his works, “no account of
human flourishing is complete that doesn’t include communion with God, man’s summum
bonum is impossible apart from reconciliation and fellowship with God.”63 This is clearly not
merely an ancient or medieval concept either; happiness in God has been seen by popular theists
as the purpose of human existence as recently as the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
Well known Cambridge and Oxford professor as well as prolific author, C. S. Lewis
ascribes to this view of human satisfaction and the happiness that relationship with God provides
throughout his writings. He remarks on the subject saying that, “out of that hopeless attempt [to
find a substitute for God] has come nearly all that we call human history—money, poverty,
ambition, war, prostitution, classes, empires, slavery—the long terrible story of man trying to
find something other than God which will make him happy.”64 This passage displays Lewis’
understanding of history and the societies and individuals throughout that have all attempted to
replace God with what is (by comparison) fleeting, frivolous, and unsatisfying. This quotation as
well as others throughout Lewis’ writings convey the idea that although there are actions and
objects which arouse one’s affections, these ultimately amount to “mud pies in a slum.”65 The
actions and objects that produce happiness in human beings do so in direct proportion that they
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reflect the goodness of God and the happiness that He produces.66 God created the world in this
way (according to Lewis) in order to provoke a longing within human beings that only God can
fulfill. Humans consistently interact with objects and actions which bring about happiness, but
only as a reflection of the happiness that Augustine, Anselm, Thomas, and Lewis claim as the
greatest happiness. David Baggett and Jerry Walls contend that even the concept of morality is a
construct built into this world that provokes longing in human beings for relationship with God.
In their book dedicated to the topic of God and ethics they state that, “The voice of morality is
the call of God to return to our only true and ultimate source of happiness.”67 Given these
attestations of the happiness that follows from relationship with God; it is well founded to
propose that relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a human being can
experience.
God desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible.
There are at least three major reasons for believing that the above statement is true.
Firstly, God’s nature (i.e. His goodness, His benevolence, His grace, etc.) is such that He could
not desire other than the maximization of these attributes as expressed in relation to other beings.
Secondly, God desires the happiness of His creatures, as claimed by William Paley. Finally, one
of God’s great-making attributes is that He is a personal being, meaning that He necessarily has
relationships with other beings and desires these relationships. These further explanations of
God’s nature taken singularly would be arguably purposive enough to merit a significant
response regarding the validity of the above statement, however taken as an aggregate they work
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to provide a cumulative case for God’s desire to have relationship with as many rational,
sentient, and free beings as possible.
Before these reasons are explored some explanation may be necessary for the sake of
clarity. In particular, the notion of what is “possible” in regard to the issue at hand (relationship
with God). Furthermore there may be some necessity for clarity as to what is meant by
“relationship” with God as well. As to the former ambiguity of God desiring as many human
beings to have relationship with Him as possible; the confusion arises in this terminology that
connotes a limitation as to the quantity of human beings which may have relationship with God.
One’s initial impulse upon hearing this qualifier of possibility is to inquire why relationship with
God is limited in any capacity.
This is a warranted skepticism. After all, if God truly is pure actuality and the greatest
possible being, then it is contradictory to claim that there is some type of limitation to or
deficiency in His goodness or power. This elicits an age-old question in philosophy. This
question is usually poised in regard to God’s nature and the problem of evil, but with a bit of
augmenting, the question accurately addresses the concern felt when it is said that God desires as
many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible. “Is he willing to [have
relationship with man], but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then [do not all men have relationship with
God]?”68 The limitation of who or how many may have relationship with God must therefore be
on the recipients (human beings) and not on the initiator (God), if God is the greatest possible
being. Although God is the Good, the source of happiness, and the ends for which mankind was
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created, it is inevitable that significantly free, sentient, and rational beings will forego this Source
and settle for mere reflections or imitations of the happiness that relationship with God
provides.69 This is due to the human’s natural propensity to inaccurately assess qualitative value
in terms of goodness.
Human beings are lower than their Creator in –all regards, but particularly in view here
is— rationality and morality, so their ability to correctly assess what is good and even more so
what is the greatest Good is considerably diminished. It is this inability that apprehends the
human mind and affections. Another explanation for this disclaimer of possibility has to do with
the nature of relationships. It would be unethical for God to force anyone into relationship with
Him. So for those human beings that attend to lower happiness than is found in God, He does not
suppress or diminish their will in order to achieve relationship with them; rather He allows their
freedom to be utilized in order that their personhood may not be suppressed in any way. This in
itself is a good act of God on His creatures. Even if a human being misses the boundless
happiness found only in the opportunity of relationship of God; He allows their freedom and
desires to be apprehended by other means. This is not God’s withholding of a good, rather it is an
act of goodness from Creator to creature. In this way, the stipulation that the greatest good is
only experienced by some and not all of the human population, is not an inhibition of God’s
character but evidence of His abounding goodness.
Similarly, God’s nature is such that He can do no other than desire and display His greatmaking attributes to their maximal degree. If God did not desire these attributes to be carried out,
then He would be less good; as He would be desiring less than the greatest good for His
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creatures. If God did not display His attributes in this way (to their maximal degree) then He
would only be the greatest possible being in theory, in other words, He would have potentiality,
and there is no potentiality in God since He is pure actuality.70
Moreover, God not only desires the maximization of His attributes, God also desires the
happiness of His creatures does so for the sake of joy—in them and in Himself.71 For God to
create beings capable of experiencing pain and happiness in such immense degrees as human
beings and then to desire other than their ultimate Good would amount to cruelty. This would
(nearly) be equivalent to a mother and father that are perfectly capable of providing for their
children emotionally, financially, and otherwise yet being either indifferent or outright neglectful
toward their children’s well-being. God is not this type of Creator, He is wholly good and loves
His creatures not obligatorily but willfully. In the same sense that it is a greater good for parents
to love their children and desire to bring about their greatest good for the sake of joy (in the
children and parents) as oppose to obligation; it is a greater good for God to desire the happiness
of His creatures in this way. As the greatest possible being, God must wish and will for the
happiness of His creatures in this way, for Him to do less would make Him a less great being,
thus He would not be God. So God not only desires the happiness of human beings, but He does
so in the greatest possible way.
Finally, a great-making attribute is to be a personal being as oppose to an impersonal or
isolated being, so God not only has relationships with other beings but He also desires these
relationships. It is inherently good to have reciprocally desired relationship with the greatest
possible being. The closer one is in relationship with God, the better that state of affairs and the
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benefits therein become. It is better that His attributes be experienced by the agents that He
creates than not; this makes being personal a great-making attribute for God. If God created, yet
harbored His goodness for Himself and not His created ones, then He would be less good than
possible (as explained above). A further note to be considered in this regard, some of God’s
attributes could not be exemplified without creatures, for instance God’s grace, forgiveness, and
justice. In this way, God has relationships necessarily in order to bring about displays of His
great-making attributes. God is also necessarily in relationship to created beings in that He is
creator, and they, His creations.72 God desires relationship with human beings precisely because
He desires their greatest good. This is a two-fold act of goodness on behalf of God. Firstly, His
creatures are afforded an opportunity to experience the greatest reservoir of goodness in
existence and become acquainted with the ends for which they were created. Secondly, God
displays His great-making attributes and they are accepted and appreciated by free, rational,
sentient beings. Thus, God desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as
possible insofar as it displays His great-making attributes and His creatures are willing to
experience the greatest good in existence.
Therefore God is a utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as
possible.
As was seen in the survey of Bentham and Mill’s literature, utilitarians by definition
desire and act for the greatest good of the greatest number of people possible, and it was
recognized in the study of classical theism that God is the greatest Good and happiness possible.
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Following this line of thought, the argument for the theory of Divine Utilitarianism states that
one of God’s great-making attributes is to will and wish the utmost happiness of His creatures
since this makes Him a greater being than the antithesis. For the sake of tolerance and the pursuit
of truth, let alternatives to this hypothesis be considered. If God does not desire the greatest
good/happiness for the greatest number of people possible, then He wishes either a lesser degree
of happiness to be available to human beings or less people to experience the greatest degree of
happiness. Neither of these alternatives are plausible for the greatest possible being; for they
would make God into either a nefarious being of the worst degree or a possessive potentate
authority which is in some capacity indifferent toward human happiness. In light of these
considerations and their implications, that relationship with God is the greatest good one can
experience and that God desires relationship with as many human beings as possible, it may be
deduced that therefore God is a utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many
human beings as possible.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHICS OF GOD
Before this case for Divine Utilitarianism is closed a comparison must be made. After all,
it is not as if Divine Utilitarianism is the only theory on the topic of God’s ethics. The
mainstream and far more popular view concerning the ethics of God is commonly referred to as
Divine Command Theory. In order to honestly represent Divine Utilitarianism one must address
its’ alternative and determine which of these theories more adequately explains the nature of God
in this regard. In this attempt to accurately and most thoroughly understand God’s ethical nature
as it relates to mankind, the explanatory power of both Divine Command Theory and Divine
Utilitarianism will be assessed. The aim of this juxtaposition will be to establish the superiority
of Divine Utilitarianism as opposed to Divine Command Theory in its capability to convey
information regarding the nature of God.
Divine Command Theory: A Juxtaposition
This view of ethics supposes (and rightly so) that “the divine will is not subject to any
principle, and God controls all truths including moral truths.”73 As the greatest possible being
and Creator of all that exists (besides Himself), God is neither subject to nor reliant on anything.
Furthermore, as the Creator and Sustainer of all created things, God is the Creator and Sustainer
of the moral law. The nature of laws is that they are instituted by a free and intelligent agent.
This means that the moral law must have been instituted (or created) by a free and intelligent
being, and since the moral law transcends humanity and is not reliant on mankind, it must have
been created by some other being—the Creator of all things, God. Divine Command Theory not
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only claims that God created the moral law, but that the moral law is whatever God declares.74 In
other words, as the instituter, Creator, and author of the moral law, what God says is right to do
or wrong to do is in fact the case, and these declarations are moral law because they are given by
the moral law giver.75
Two criticisms that frequently arise against this theory are the claims that 1) Divine
Command Theory makes it possible for God to command evil actions to become good actions
and 2) that morality is arbitrary on this view. The first criticism is easily enough refuted; it
merely requires that one remind oneself of the framework within which Divine Command
Theory works (i.e. classical theism). God, the greatest possible being by definition, cannot wish
or will evil to be done; rather He desires the greatest good possible for the greatest number of
people. This can never mean that God commands evil, for this would make God less than the
greatest possible being. As for the second objection to Divine Command Theory, most adherents
of this theory respond in a similar fashion. Baggett and Walls provide a response which explains
“that all of God’s commands are deeply resonant with his character, and that divine command
theory must be built on the foundation of God’s loving nature.” They go on to explain that
because this is the case, God’s “commands don’t lack good reasons” and “Divine command
theory does not make God capricious.”76 So then, it is God’s nature and His necessary goodness
which ensures that all of His moral declarations are good and that they cannot be other than
good.
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What Divine Command Theory Explains
As expressed above, Divine Command Theory communicates two major ideas
concerning God and morality. Firstly, God is the Creator, sustainer, and instituter of morality. In
this way, He is the moral law giver. Secondly, as the moral law giver, whatever declarations or
commands that God gives concerning moral action becomes moral law due to His moral
authority as Creator and instituter of the law, thus providing an explanation of what is good. So
the explanatory power of Divine Command Theory may be accurately and concisely summarized
by saying that the theory explains what God does in relation to mankind and ethics and that it
effectively communicates what constitutes a good or right action as well as a reprehensible
action. In effect, this theory answers the question of what God does by simply stating that God
defines the moral law and whatever actions are aligned with this divine will are good based upon
their conformity to the divine will. However, merely answering what God does and what is good
seems to be a fairly low bar of explanatory power.
What Divine Command Theory Fails to Explain
Although Divine Command Theory articulates what God does in terms of morality and
mankind; this is of profoundly little use in terms of what one desires an ethical system to explain.
As soon as a rather thorough explication of God’s nature is heard, one might expect for morality
to be contingent on whatever actions reflect the nature and will of this perfect being. With this in
mind, Divine Command Theory does not come as a surprise to the person that understands
“God” in classical theistic terms; rather it leaves the classical theist wanting more answers. One
might even appeal that Divine Command Theory is a tautology for the classical theist, because
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he already understands the Good to be God and good actions to be in line with God’s will.
William Alston goes so far in his article “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” as
to liken the phrases “is morally wrong” and “is contrary to a command of God” with “water” and
“H2O”.77 This reinforces the previous claim that Divine Command Theory merely purports
tautologies for classical theists. It is the case that Divine Command Theory also gives an
explanation of what is right or good, ethically speaking.78 However, again, this is a tautology for
classical theists that follow the thought of Augustine, Anselm, or Thomas.
Alston goes further still with his criticism of Divine Command Theory by claiming that
the theory suffers from at least two serious weaknesses. First, he cites the common objection to
Divine Command Theory which was given a brief treatment above. This objection makes
morality arbitrary depending on God’s propensity toward capriciousness. Second, Alston
contends that Divine Command Theory creates a type of Euthyphro dilemma.79 He formulates
this potential dilemma as follows, “Is it that: 2. We ought to, e.g., love one another because God
commands us to do so. or is it that: 3. God commands us to love one another because that is what
we ought to do.”80 In regards to Alston’s objection of arbitrariness, what is at stake here is the
objectivity or subjectivity of morality. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong expresses this same hesitation
toward Divine Command Theory when he states that, “even if God in fact never would or could
command us to rape, the divine command theory still implies the counterfactual that, if God did
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command us to rape, then we would have a moral obligation to rape. That is absurd.”81 The
typical responses that Divine Command theorists provide in regard to this indictment state that
the objection is predicated upon mere counterfactuals and non-possibilities, therefore the
objection is irrelevant and obsolete.82 As for the second objection that Alston marshals against
Divine Command Theory, the adherent to the theory must discern some way in which two ends
are satisfied. 1) The establishing that neither the objectivity of morality nor the intrinsic
goodness of God are impugned and 2) Divine Command Theory is true. This may prove to be a
worthy challenge for the theory since it seems (as Alston has communicated) that the two –God
and morality— are dependent upon one another in some sense.
Finally, if the answers that Divine Command Theory provides are unsatisfying and the
objections to the theory are insurmountable, then one must seek to answer deeper, more
substantive questions regarding the ethical framework that God utilizes in his relations with
mankind. For instance, the subject of why God does what He does which is thoroughly dealt with
in Divine Utilitarianism, but is hardly (if at all) addressed by Divine Command Theory.
Furthermore, one may desire to associate an ethical theory with God which does not suffer from
the objections of arbitrariness and a sort of quasi-Euthyphro dilemma.
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What Divine Utilitarianism Explains
Divine Utilitarianism is deeply concerned with understanding why God does what He
does. Although adherents of Divine Utilitarianism would agree with Divine Command Theorists
that God is the moral law giver and that whatever He declares as a good or reprehensible action
is as He says; the believer in Divine Utilitarianism would say that this is not substantive enough
or satisfactory in explaining the ethics of God. Thus, while it does convey some information
concerning the ethics of God; it does not provide an exhaustive treatment of the subject, whereas
Divine Utilitarianism works to explain why God acts in the way that He does with mankind and
ethics. The qualitative difference in what one does and why one does something can be clearly
seen given a myriad of ethical situations.
For instance, it may be difficult for one to justify the actions of a person lying, stealing,
or killing if one is only afforded an explanation of what was perpetrated (i.e. the lying, stealing
killing). These actions may be swiftly accepted in certain circumstances though, such as lying to
a Nazi officer in order to save the lives of Jewish citizens, stealing in an effort to feed one’s
starving family, or killing one nefarious person so that many righteous people may live. The only
difference in the former and the latter set of actions is the context. This is to say that what
happened did not change, however why the actions took place provided such a great amount of
information that it often causes one to reconsider a strictly deontological view of these actions.
This is precisely the reason that situations such as these are referred to as ethical dilemmas. In his
“Moral Obstacles: An Alternative to the Doctrine of Double Effect” Gerhard Øverland expounds
on this phenomenon of ethical dilemmas and one’s responsibility to understand why an ethical
action takes place. The totality of this article is dedicated to establishing that when an ethical
action is taken by an individual in an ethical dilemma, there is a preferred option, and an option
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is preferred when it minimizes cost and maximizes good. Regarding ethical actions such as these
Øverland contends, “to say that it is permissible to impose a certain cost on a person just because
he has a duty to bear this cost does not solve the problem of justification. We need to know why
the person has a duty to bear cost in the first place…A [person] has a duty to bear additional cost
because his presence gives rise to cost, and fairness dictates that he should bear some of it.”83
This conclusion benefits the case for Divine Utilitarianism in at least two ways. Firstly, it
emphasizes the significance of understanding why an action is taken (such as, why God does
what He does in relation to mankind). Secondly, it enables one to recognize that although God
does not bring all of mankind into relationship with Himself (because of man’s apprehension, not
God’s—as was seen earlier), when a person does not partake in relationship with God it is
because fairness dictates that they must bear the responsibility (or cost) of their denial to partake
in this relationship. In short, the distinction between what God does and why He does it is not an
insignificant one, and the more satisfactory answer for these inquiries is found in Divine
Utilitarianism.
As expressed throughout this work, Divine Utilitarianism is the belief that God desires
the greatest good for the greatest number and He acts in relation with mankind in order to bring
about that end. So as for the query concerning why God does what He does, the abbreviated
answer of Divine Utilitarianism is that he acts in order that the greatest good may come about for
the greatest number of human beings—and this good is that they may have relationship with
God, the Good. A more thorough response to this question on the Divine Utilitarian point of
view explains that God acts in the way that He does in order to bring human beings into this
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relationship and that this relationship will produce worship of Himself by these rational, sentient,
free agents. This reveals another issue which is addressed by Divine Utilitarianism; God’s
necessity to be worshipped.
‘Necessity’ here does not mean that God needs worship in order to be fulfilled or in order
to maintain His existence; rather this means that a being that is good to the degree that God is,
must be worshipped, or demands worship.84 God’s ontology is not dependent or contingent on
anything, including the degree to which He is worshipped. This expands the explanatory power
of Divine Utilitarianism, as it is capable of elucidating upon why God necessitates worship and
how this necessity is fulfilled. Brian Leftow contributes a fair amount of time and effort
establishing that God is such a being that necessitates worship in his book God and Necessity.
Working under the assumption of classical theism he says, “If something is a deity, then just qua
a deity, it intrinsically and objectively is an appropriate object of greatest worship…anything
deserving greatest worship is in a better state than anything that does not.”85 Leftow refines this
definition of a being that is worthy and deserving of worship by explaining precisely what he
means by worship. “Greatest worship is the attitude of greatest respect, admiration, honor, and
awe, or the activity of expressing this attitude. So something intrinsically and objectively is an
appropriate object of greatest worship only if it intrinsically and objectively deserves more of
these than anything not an appropriate object of greatest worship.”86 Understanding Leftow’s
terminology enables one to determine whether God truly does necessitate worship or if this is
simply a presupposition made by theists.
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According to this definition of worship, the only way that God could not be intrinsically
and objectively worthy of worship (i.e. necessitate worship) would be if there were a being
which were more deserving of respect, admiration, honor, and awe. However, God is the greatest
possible being and He possesses and displays all great-making attributes to their maximal degree,
so there is no being that is greater or more worthy of worship than God. Due to this simple albeit
profound understanding of God and of worship, it is not logically possible for a being other than
the classical theistic God to necessitate or be intrinsically and objectively worthy of worship. In
short, Leftow expresses that God necessitates worship because He is God; He is the being which
is so great and so good that He cannot exist without being worshipped, and there is no being in
existence which could possibly force God to abdicate this role. This necessity of worship is
explained two-fold in Divine Utilitarianism.
Firstly, because Divine Utilitarianism is built upon the foundation of classical theism,
God must be worshipped because a being worthy of worship is better than one undeserving of it
(as Leftow articulates). A skeptic of theism, J. N. Findlay claims that if God is in fact the being
that Anselm claims Him to be, then He is an “adequate object of religious worship.”87 While
Findlay denies that God is Anselm’s greatest conceivable being; he admits that such a being
would necessitate worship if it exists. This astute observation made by theists and skeptics alike
(as has been adequately shown here); assists in silencing a significant objection which has been
and –no doubt— will continue to be marshalled against Divine Utilitarianism.
In his two-volume treatise concerning God’s ethics, James Moody Gustafson strongly
refutes the idea that God’s ethical system could be consequentialist/utilitarian in nature.
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Gustafson contends that if God is a utilitarian, then His ethics are not theocentric; rather they are
anthropocentric, and he finds this to be a terribly impious doctrine.88 However, if God acts as a
utilitarian, then He will be worshipped as a result of His actions.89 Gustafson seems to entertain
this notion of Divine Utilitarianism leading to the worship of God when he says that, “the only
way in which one can have theocentric ethics which finally sustains and supports the idea that
what God wills is what is good for man is to argue that the good for human beings coincides with
the ultimate divine purpose. Historically, most of Christian ethics has assumed this to be the
case.”90 This observation by Gustafson brings a significant distinction of Divine Utilitarianism to
light. Divine Utilitarianism does not say that all of God’s actions are ultimately aimed at
anthropocentric ends; rather all that God does is ultimately done for His own glory. However, all
of God’s actions in relation to human beings are aimed at the happiness of human beings, and
this results in God being worshipped and glorified. So although God does all things for His own
glory, His actions towards human beings are aimed at bringing about their greatest
happiness/good. Thus, although God’s actions may not be as thoroughly or overtly theocentric as
individuals such as Gustafson would prefer; His actions do in fact work towards the ends of His
creatures’ happiness and worship of Himself by His creatures.
Secondly, the purpose for which God acts in Divine Utilitarianism merits and requires
worship as an appropriate response. God acts in in order to produce the greatest good for the
greatest number of human beings, which is relationship with their Creator. This relationship
necessarily results in worship of God by human beings because this relationship gives free,
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rational, and sentient beings the greatest happiness possible for them and this act of God deserves
praise. Although the idea of God as a utilitarian is unpopular and it is commonly seen as an
impious proposal, when one recognizes the effects that God as a utilitarian has on one’s theology
(such as satisfying His need to be worshipped) one recognizes the immense veneration that
Divine Utilitarianism conjures in the creature, for the Creator. Mill once remarked on this
subject,
We not uncommonly hear the doctrine of utility inveighed against as a godless doctrine.
If it be necessary to say anything at all against so mere an assumption, we may say that
the question depends upon what idea we have formed of the moral character of the Deity.
If it be a true belief that God desires, above all things, the happiness of his creatures, and
that this was his purpose in their creation, utility is not only not a godless doctrine, but
more profoundly religious than any other.91
In this way, worship of God is the action which necessarily follows when man gains relationship
with God (the greatest good/happiness), and it is utilitarian for God to act in order to bring this
state of affairs about. This is how God satisfies His necessity to be worshipped through the
construct of Divine Utilitarianism. The explanatory power of Divine Utilitarianism may be
expanded in at least one more way; by revealing that the idea of God as a utilitarian has been
appealed to regularly by theists in Philosophy of religion.
This final revelation concerning the explanatory power of Divine Utilitarianism merely
makes the distinction that there is already a theistic construct that frames God as a utilitarian in
His ethics. A standard and widely accepted response that theists give to the problem of evil is
that God allows evil to exist and occur so that greater goods may occur. Rowe explicates the
nature of theodicies this way,
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What a theodicy does endeavor to do is to fasten on some good (real or imaginary) and
argue that achieving that good would justify an omnipotent being in permitting evils like
the fawn’s suffering…if obtaining the good in question were God’s aim in permitting
evils like the fawn’s suffering, then (given what we know) it would be reasonable to
believe that an omnipotent being would be justified in permitting such evils.92
Thus, the theists’ best defense against the problem of evil is to hope to convince his opponent
that the good which results from the occurrence of evil is of a great enough amount or quality
that it justifies God allowing evil to be perpetrated in the world. In short, “God allows evils to
happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom.”93 Charles Journet corroborates this view that
“God permits, indeed, that evils come about so as to draw greater goods from them.”94
Identifying that theists appeal to God as a utilitarian in order to resolve their most prominent and
challenging objection puts theists in somewhat of a dilemma. The theist may either say that God
is not a utilitarian and therefore does not act in order to bring about the greatest good for the
greatest number, which would cause the theist to abandon their defense of theodicies; or the
theist can confer that God is in fact a utilitarian and maintain intellectual honesty in holding to
the concept of theodicies.
This dilemma is quite significant for a vast majority of theists because most theists do not
have a consequentialist ethical system, rather they are typically virtue ethicists. The most
significant issue that virtue ethicists (even more so, theistic virtue ethicists) have with
utilitarianism is that it allows for evil to be perpetrated in order that a greater good may be
achieved. This is precisely why this dilemma is so challenging for most theists; they are being
challenged to accept that their most beloved being (God) allows abhorrent actions to occur in
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order to bring about some greater good.95 This is the most repulsive and offensive doctrine of
utilitarianism to most virtue ethicists, so it is understandable that the challenge to accept this
attribute or action within the ethics of God is a difficult one to accept. However, it seems that
theists have been accepting God as a utilitarian all along. After all, theodicies have been common
theistic defenses for millennia.96 So, in effect, although theists have not accepted God as a
utilitarian being in all of His actions; it seems that they have accepted Him as such when it has
proved to be helpful.
This is a particularly difficult reality for most theists to accept because they are not
comfortable with attributing the Machiavellian concept of “the ends justifying the means” to
their deity.97 However, if the ends of God’s actions are to bring about states of affairs such as,
human relationship with Himself, worship of Himself by free, rational, sentient beings, and the
happiness of His creatures; then the ends for which God acts do in fact justify the means. It is
these ends which have been promoted and defended throughout this work, and it is these ends
which God acts in accordance with.
This expansion in the explanatory power of Divine Utilitarianism has a two-fold effect
for the theory itself. First, the claim that evil may not be permitted or committed in order to bring
about some greater good will no doubt be an objection marshalled against Divine Utilitarianism
as well, so the redirection of this objection toward theodicies will defend Divine Utilitarianism.
Second, this identification of theodicies as a result of a utilitarian God will cause theists that are
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averse to utilitarianism to objectively consider the potentiality of God having a utilitarian ethic.
The objection against the allowance of evil for the outcome of a greater good will be subsided
one way or another once the theist that is objecting recognizes that he already believes that God
is utilitarian in exactly this way; that God allows evil in order that greater goods may come
about. It is appalling to theistic virtue ethicists to think that one could cause pain in order to bring
about good, but once a skeptic of theism claims that God and evil cannot coexist in the world,
these theistic virtue ethicists appeal to the utilitarian concept that they find most repulsive in
hopes of resolving an objection to their worldview. The theist must compromise on some front;
either God is a utilitarian in His ethics and wills and acts in order to bring about the greatest good
for the greatest number—which allows for evil in the world in order to bring about greater
goods, or he does not view God in this way and the theist is in need of reconstructing a response
to how it is that evil and God (the Good) can coexist.98
Assessing the Juxtaposition
While Divine Command Theory explains what God does in regards to morality, it does
not seem sufficient for explaining why God does what He does. This theory reveals what makes
an action right or good by identifying that an action is good insofar as it reflects the nature of
God. This was claimed to be a tautology for classical theists because it can be deduced or even
included in one’s understanding of God as a being. Divine Utilitarianism by contrast, explained
why God does what He does, how God’s necessity to be worshipped is satisfied, and identified
that theodicies are a utilitarian construct that is appealed to in order to justify the coexistence of
God and evil. Given this juxtaposition of these two competing theories, it appears that Divine
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Utilitarianism provides more of a holistic justification for his worldview, in that it explains how
multiple facets and doctrines of theism are to be understood in light of the nature of God, as a
utilitarian being.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Divine Utilitarianism can only be properly understood if one has a proper understanding
of what is meant by the divine and by utilitarianism. So in order to appropriately articulate the
theory of Divine Utilitarianism definitions of God and of utility were promoted. For a proper
understanding of God and His nature the works of Anselm and Thomas Aquinas were examined.
Anselm submitted that God is the being that-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought,99 and
Thomas believed God to be the greatest possible being, having no potentiality and being pure
actuality.100 With this framework concerning God and His nature set, focus transitioned to
understanding what is meant by “utility”. In this endeavor Augustine’s belief that there are
degrees of goodness was addressed first, then the ethical philosophies of Bentham and Mill were
discussed. It was in this section that it was discerned, if Augustine is correct in regards to degrees
of goodness, then God is the greatest good, the Good. In conjunction with this belief, Bentham
and Mill’s utilitarian principle of doing the greatest good for the greatest number was addressed.
This foundation of terms then allowed for the theory of Divine Utilitarianism to be articulated.
William Paley commits entire sections of his Moral and Political Philosophy to
expressing the idea that God is a utilitarian. He does this by appealing to his revered teleological
argument and taking it a step further into the ethical branch of philosophy. John Gay and
William Paley both contended that God not only created the world such that it is hospitable for
human life but that it is designed for the flourishing of human life. They go further by saying that
God wished and willed the happiness of human beings when He created them.101 This concept of
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Divine Utilitarianism brought about a new argument in support of the theory which is
significantly different but arrives at the same conclusion of God as a utilitarian ethicist. This new
Divine Utilitarianism argued that, P1) Relationship with God is the greatest good/happiness a
human being can experience. P2) God desires as many human beings to have relationship with
Him as possible. P3) Utilitarians desire the greatest good/happiness for as many human beings as
possible. C) Therefore God is a utilitarian because He desires the greatest good for as many
human beings as possible. This argument utilizes the aforementioned definitions of God and
utility in order to establish that if these definitions are in fact the case, then God is a utilitarian.
The distinction was drawn however that Divine Utilitarianism is not the only ethical
theory that people attempt to claim as descriptive of and applicable to God. The rival theory to
Divine Utilitarianism is Divine Command Theory. Divine Command Theory is the popular
stance regarding the ethics of God, and it explains that God is the moral law giver, thus whatever
commands or declarations He makes concerning morality and what is right to do or wrong to do,
is in fact the case due to His moral authority.102 This effort to understand morality and the ethics
of God effectively educates regarding what God does in relation to morality and what actions are
good and for what reasons are they good. However, this is not seen as satisfactory for the
adherent of Divine Utilitarianism.
A juxtaposition concerned with addressing the explanatory power of these opposing
theories shows that Divine Utilitarianism explicates more about God’s nature and ethics than
Divine Command Theory is capable of. Whereas the latter of these efforts gives understanding of
what God does and what actions are considered morally praiseworthy or reprehensible; the
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former theory gives explanations concerning why God does what He does, how God’s necessity
to be worshipped by free, rational, sentient beings is satisfied, and how theodicies are justified as
a response to the problem of evil. The explanatory power of these theories is palpably contrasted
by this juxtaposition. Divine Command Theory goes much farther into its discovery of God’s
nature, how He relates the mankind, and how mankind relates to Him. It is this capability of
providing a more satisfactory understanding of God, coupled with the purposive nature of the
argument in favor of Divine Utilitarianism which reveal it to be a considerable candidate for
understanding the ethics of God.
Finally, if the objective of this paper has been met, then Divine Utilitarianism has been
shown to be a plausible if not outright veridical belief concerning the ethics of God. For, if
relationship with God truly is the greatest good/happiness a human being can experience, God
desires as many human beings to have relationship with Him as possible, and utilitarians desire
the greatest good/happiness for as many human beings as possible, then God is a utilitarian
because He desires the greatest good for as many human beings as possible. Further still, if this
is the case, then various areas of one’s theology and philosophy will yield more clarity. These
areas include that one will know why God acts or what ends He aims to bring about when He
acts. One will also have a sufficient answer for how God’s necessity to be worshipped is satisfied
since relationship with God intrinsically brings about worship of Him by rational, free, sentient
beings. Lastly, this approach to God’s ethics brings much needed clarity and fluidity to the
subject of theodicies. On the contrary, if one finds Divine Utilitarianism –the way that it is
argued for in this work— to be an abhorrent doctrine, or erroneous in some capacity, or even
entirely fallacious, then the questions that are answered by the theory must be accounted for in
one’s subsequent and rebutting argument. However, it is contended here that God’s desire to
62

bring about the greatest happiness for as many human beings as possible through relationship
with Him is the most satisfactory answer to these aforementioned queries. The reality that God
intentionally acts in order to bring about the greatest good and happiness for His creatures –at
least admittedly in the area of theodicies— is an incredibly blessed truth that ought to not only
encourage all of mankind, but rouse a desire within human beings to know God more thoroughly
and intimately—for their greatest happiness and for the necessary and deserved worship of God.
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